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Abstract
We underline that some results obtained in the literature on central
bank transparency may be quite diﬀerent when we take a non-Bayesian
approach to uncertainty, where "ambiguity" is taken into account. We
consider some specific argument of the literature (obtained under a
Bayesian approach), which implies that political uncertainty can be
beneficial and central bank transparency harmful. We show that when
ambiguity is large enough, these results do not hold anymore: political
uncertainty is always harmful and central bank transparency always
beneficial. Furthermore, as soon as we depart from the Bayesian case,
Knightian uncertainty is always harmful.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, there has been a widespread move of central banks
toward more transparency. Such a move has in part been due to the trend
toward more central bank (CB) independence. Being more independent, CBs
had to be more accountable and, for that, had to be more transparent about
the way they conducted their monetary policies. But there are also economic
reasons for CBs to be more transparent. By providing additional information
on the underlying factors aﬀecting monetary policy (objectives of the CB,
economic data and forecasts made by the CB, procedures involved in the
decision process,...) transparency can help the private sector to make better
decisions. As a consequence, there has been a large development of both the
theoretical and the empirical literature on the economic eﬀects and possible
usefulness of increased CB transparency.
Theoretical studies have mixed conclusions. Although some results are
favorable to transparency, there are also several types of arguments pointing
to the possible deficiencies of increased transparency. Thus, the results ob-
tained in the literature depend on the model considered and on the specific
assumptions made1.
In this paper, we will develop the argument that the results obtained in
the literature may also depend on the approach to uncertainty which is taken.
The theoretical literature on CB transparency usually adopts a Bayesian
expected utility criterion2. However, Knight (1921) already argued that a
distinction should be made between a situation of "risk", where there is some
known objective probability distribution, and a situation of "(Knightian)
uncertainty", where this is not the case. Furthermore, some insuﬃciencies
of the Bayesian approach (where uncertainty is represented by a subjective
probability distribution) in describing behavior have been pointed out. Thus,
1From a rather general point of view, if we have a situation where there are some
ineﬃciencies in the economy, then this can make a lack of transparency beneficial, because
a less informed private sector may help to reduce these ineﬃciencies. Depending on the
model or on the specific assumptions made, this may or may not occur.
Concerning empirical results, although there are some diﬀerences in the results obtained
in the various specific studies, broadly speaking, the overall picture which arises from the
empirical literature seems to be that CB transparency does have an impact on the private
sector’s behavior. Financial markets and some macroeconomic variables like expected
inflation appear to be favorably aﬀected.
For some recent surveys of the theoretical and of the empirical literature on CB trans-
parency, see, for example, Blinder and al. (2008) and van der Cruisen and Eijﬃnger
(2007).
2An exception is Schipper and Winschel (2004). They introduce Knightian uncertainty
in an ambiguous game framework. The similarities and diﬀerences between their analysis
and the analysis of the present paper are mentioned in Section 3 below.
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the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg (1961)) has underlined the existence of some
"aversion to ambiguity". Therefore, in the last two or three decades, new
approaches to uncertainty, where such an aversion to ambiguity is introduced,
and which encompass the Bayesian approach as a special case, have been
developed3.
Here, we will use such a non-Bayesian approach to uncertainty. We will
consider some rather simple specific argument against central bank trans-
parency which is found in the literature. Then, we will show that the results
can be overturned when we depart from the Bayesian case. Instead of being a
case against transparency, the argument can become a case for transparency.
The specific argument of the literature that we will consider, underlines
that increased uncertainty on the CB’s preferences may be beneficial through
its favorable eﬀect on the level of the nominal wage (Grüner (2002) and
Sorensen (1991)). The argument relies on the analysis of a game between
a monopoly labor union and a CB. The labor union sets the nominal wage
before the CB chooses its monetary policy. As the weight the CB attaches to
its inflation objective relatively to its unemployment objective is not known
to the labor union, this creates some uncertainty on how the CB reacts to
the nominal wage. It is then shown that more uncertainty decreases the level
of the nominal wage chosen by the labor union. As a consequence, this may
improve macroeconomic performance defined in terms of unemployment and
inflation, and therefore be beneficial4.
In this analysis of the literature, uncertainty is represented by a proba-
bility distribution, and a standard expected utility criterion is used. More
uncertainty is associated with a greater variance of the probability distribu-
tion. In Sorensen (1991), the source of the uncertainty is assumed to be some
political factors, and the implication of the result is that political uncertainty,
which creates variability in the weight between the CB’s objectives, may be
beneficial. In Grüner (2002), this result is rather interpreted as an argu-
ment against too much transparency, where more transparency is assumed
to imply a lower variance of the probability distribution.
3Two classical references are Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989). In
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the decision maker has a set of probability distributions,
instead of a unique probability distribution, and uses a maxmin criterion over this set of
distributions. In Schmeidler (1989), non additive probabilities ("capacities") are used.
In these non-Bayesian frameworks, the presence of some aversion to ambiguity leads the
decision maker to give more weight to the bad outcomes implied by each decision.
A survey of some economic applications can be found in Mukerji and Tallon (2004).
4This argument has been developed by Sorensen (1991). Grüner (2002) gave an in-
terpretation in terms of CB transparency, and also showed that reduced uncertainty on
the CB’s preferences (which may be due to more CB transparency) may actually increase
inflation uncertainty.
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As we have indicated, in the present paper, we will revaluate this argu-
ment by using a non-Bayesian approach, where the decision maker has some
aversion to ambiguity. Such a framework will allow us to introduce Knight-
ian uncertainty into the analysis. As we want to compare situations which
are more or less uncertain in some sense, we need to consider the eﬀects of
changes in the information available to the decision maker. Therefore, we
will consider a non-Bayesian approach which makes explicit the information
available to the decision maker5. We will use the approach of Gajdos et
al. (2004), which introduces some aversion to ambiguity under the form of
an "aversion to the imprecision of information". Under this approach, the
information available to the decision maker consists in two things: a "cen-
tral probability distribution"; and a set of possible probability distributions
around this central probability distribution, which represents Knightian un-
certainty around this central distribution.
We will assume that political factors create some underlying fluctuations
in the CB’s preferences which follow some given probability distribution.
This probability distribution is only imperfectly known to the private sector.
In the information available to the private sector, the central probability
distribution is an estimate of this probability distribution obtained under
some central prior, while Knightian uncertainty around this central distribu-
tion represents the sensitivity of the estimates to other priors. Increased CB
transparency reduces both the variance of the central distribution and the
amount of Knightian uncertainty.
The presence of Knightian uncertainty and of some aversion to ambiguity
will lead to results which are diﬀerent, and often opposite to those obtained
in the literature under a Bayesian approach. First, we will find that an
increase in the variance of the central distribution, which may be due to
more variable political factors or to less CB transparency, does not aﬀect the
nominal wage when we are far enough from the Bayesian case. Consequently,
in this case, this greater variance can never be beneficial and is in general
harmful. Second, we will find that the nominal wage is never lowered but,
on the contrary, is often raised by an increase in Knightian uncertainty. As
a consequence, more Knightian uncertainty is, in general, always harmful.
These results tend to make more political uncertainty harmful, and more
CB transparency beneficial. This is opposite to what was underlined in the
literature under the Bayesian approach.
Our framework of analysis is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, the
5This is not the case for the two classical approaches previously mentioned. In Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), or in Schmeidler (1989), the information available to the decision
maker is not made explicit.
4
equilibrium nominal wage is determined. The eﬀects on the nominal wage
of changes in the variance of the central distribution, or of the amount of
Knightian uncertainty, is considered. The welfare eﬀects are examined in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework of analysis
2.1 Model
As we only want to change the way uncertainty is treated, we will take the
same model as in Grüner (2002)6. The model is static. There is a unique
labor union (LU) in the labor market and we consider a two-stage game
between the LU and the central bank (CB). The LU fixes the nominal wage
at the beginning of the period, and the CB subsequently determines the
inflation rate. The equations are the following:
UCB = −ψπ2 − u2 ; ψ > 0 (1)
ULU = w − π − A
2
u2 ; A > 0 (2)
u = a(w − π) ; a > 0 (3)
UCB and ULU represent the utility functions of the CB and of the LU,
respectively. The CB tries to stabilize both inflation π and unemployment
u around some desired levels, with a relative weight given by ψ (the desired
levels for inflation and employment are normalized to zero). The LU wants
to stabilize unemployment around the same level as the CB (with a relative
weight given by A), and to increase the (log) real wage w − π, where w
represents the (log) nominal wage (we use the normalization p−1 = 0, where
p−1 is the (log) price level of the previous period, which implies π = p).
After the nominal wage has been fixed, unemployment is determined by labor
demand, according to equation (3) , where unemployment is an increasing
function of the real wage7,8.
6This model is itself taken from the existing literature analyzing the interaction of
labor unions and the CB, and its implications for monetary policy and the macroeconomic
equilibrium (Cukierman and Lippi (1999)).
7As in Grüner (2002), there is no shock in equation (3) . Note that by a suitable
normalization of the nominal wage and price variables, the constant term in this equation
can always be taken equal to zero.
8We could as well assume that, as in Sorensen (1991), the LU has only a real wage
objective. For, using (2) and (3), we obtain ULU = −Aa22 (w − π − ω∗)2 +
1
2Aa2 , where
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The equilibrium of the game is solved backward. In the second stage,
once w has been fixed by the LU, the CB chooses π which maximizes UCB
under the constraint (3) . This leads to the reaction function π = bw, where
b = a
2
a2+ψ . Using the notation γ ≡ 1− b, we get
γ =
ψ
a2 + ψ
(4)
We have 0 < γ < 1. The CB’s reaction function can then be written:
w − π = γw (5)
In the first stage, the LU, when choosingw, takes into account the reaction
function (5) of the CB. Using (2), (3) and (5) we get
ULU = γw − Aa
2
2
γ2w2 (6)
It is assumed that the LU does not know the CB’s preferences. As ψ is
unknown, γ is also unknown. We now have to be more explicit on how we
model this uncertainty on γ9.
2.2 Uncertainty
2.2.1 Available information
As in Sorensen (1991), varying political factors make the CB’s preferences
fluctuate. Therefore, we will assume that parameter γ is a random variable
which follows some probability distribution P ∗. Let γ0 and σ
∗2 be the mean
and variance of P ∗, respectively.
Suppose that P ∗ depends on some underlying parameters that are not
perfectly known. The LU tries to estimate these underlying parameters by
using some available data. For that, the LU first does some Bayesian statisti-
cal analysis where data are combined with some prior that the LU may have
ω∗ = 1Aa2 > 0 would be the LU’s real wage desired level.
Note that, using (3) , this implies ULU = −A2 (u − aω∗)2 +
1
2Aa2 . Therefore, the LU
could also as well be considered as having an implicit unemployment desired level u∗LU =
aω∗ = 1Aa > 0, which is higher than the CB’s unemployment desired level (which is equal
to zero).
9As in Grüner (2002), we focus on the random variable γ (or equivalently b). However,
as underlined by Dai and Sidiropoulos (2008), the results can be modified if we take the
variance of ψ, rather than the variance of γ, as the parameter which decreases when
transparency increases. Theses authors show that this can give a role to the degree of
conservativeness of central bankers.
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on the underlying parameters. This will lead to some posterior probability
distribution on these parameters. Then, this posterior probability distribu-
tion on the underlying parameters of P ∗ can be used to give a probability
distribution on γ. Let us call C this "central probability distribution" on γ.
In order to simplify the analysis and to get rid of any role that a bias in the
mean of C may play in our analysis, we assume that C has the same mean
γ0 as P
∗. Let σ2γ be the variance of C.
The distribution C depends on the prior held on the underlying parame-
ters of P ∗. Other priors would have given diﬀerent distributions. Therefore,
the LU also does some robustness analysis, by taking some set of priors
around the prior used in order to get C. This leads to a set P of probability
distributions around C . This lack of confidence put on the central distribu-
tion C may be viewed as "Knightian uncertainty". We will assume that this
set P is given by10
P = {(1− δ)C + δP : P ∈ R (S)} (7)
where S is some subset of [0, 1] which is known to contain the support of
P ∗ (and therefore the support of C is also assumed to be in S). R (S) is
the set of all probability distributions having support contained in S. This
means that any possible distribution can be written as a weighted average of
the central distribution C and of a distribution with support contained in S.
(Therefore, the support of any possible distribution is also in S).
Parameter 1 − δ, where we have 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, measures the degree of
confidence put on the central distribution C. A larger value of δ implies
a greater imprecision of information around C, and therefore increases the
amount of Knightian uncertainty. In the limit case δ = 0, we have P = {C} ,
and Knightian uncertainty disappears. In the other limit case δ = 1, we have
P = R (S) . Then, there is complete ignorance (except for the fact that all
possible distributions have support in S).
10Such a set of probability distributions, defined by "contamination" from a given prob-
ability distribution, has been considered in the literature on robust Bayesian analysis (see
Berger and Berliner (1986)). But, in this literature, this concerned the class of "priors" on
the underlying parameters, before data had been used. Here, it concerns the distributions
on γ which result from the "posterior" distributions on the underlying parameters, after
data have been used.
Such a class of probability distributions, defined by "contamination", has also been used
by Epstein and Wang (1994). However, in Epstein and Wang (1994) it does not represent
the available information, but the probability set used in a Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
framework, where the information available is not made explicit. It therefore represents a
mix of the uncertainty on the information available, on the one hand, and of the aversion
to uncertainty, on the other hand. In our framework, however, it only concerns the infor-
mation available to the decision maker, while some kind of aversion to uncertainty will be
separately considered (and is represented by parameter θ below in the text).
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In order to simplify the analysis, we will further assume that S is a
symmetric interval around γ0. We take S = [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] , where µ > 0
is a parameter which represents the length of that interval. As we have
0 < γ < 1, parameter µ has to satisfy the inequalities µ < γ0 and µ < 1−γ0.
Thus, the information available to the LU is given by {C,P} .
2.2.2 Criterion
We will use the approach of Gajdos et al. (2004) which makes the informa-
tion available to the decision maker explicit. The available information has
the form we have just considered. It is given by [C,P], where C is a "central
probability distribution" around which there is some "imprecision of infor-
mation", expressed by the fact that all probability distributions contained in
the set P are considered as possible.
The axiomatic approach of Gajdos et al. (2004)11 introduces some kind
of aversion to ambiguity in an axiom of "aversion to the imprecision of in-
formation". It leads to a criterion which consists in a weighted average of
two terms: the expected utility under the central distribution C, on the one
hand; and the minimum of the expected utility under the (convex hull co(P)
of the) set P of all possible probability distributions, on the other hand (see
Gajdos et al. (2004) Theorem 2 p.661)12. Therefore, the criterion which the
LU maximises is given by
ΩLU = (1− θ)ECULU + θ
∙
min
P∈co(P)
EPULU
¸
(8)
where EP and EC represent the corresponding expected value operators. In
this equation, parameter θ, which belongs to [0, 1] , represents the "aversion
to the imprecision of information" of the LU.
11In this axiomatic approach, the preferences of the decision maker concern both the
decision f (or "act"), which, in the case of the LU, is equal to w, and the available
information [C,P]: it is a binary relation on couples (f, [C,P]).
12A criterion which involves a weighted average between an expected utility under a
given distribution, and a minimum of expected utilities under a set of possible distribu-
tions, can also be obtained under the non-additive probabilities approach of Schmeidler
(1989) (see Eichberger and Kelsey (1999)); or under the approach of Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) when the set of distributions is defined by "contamination" (see Epstein and
Wang (1994)).
8
From (7) and (8) we get the criterion given by13
ΩLU = (1− α)ECULU + α
∙
min
P∈R(S)
EPULU
¸
(9)
where we have
α = θδ (10)
This criterion is a weighted average of two terms: the expected utility
under C, on the one hand; and the minimum of the utility for all distributions
having their supports contained in S, on the other hand. This second term
indicates that (as long as we have α 6= 0), for each decision considered, the
LU gives an additional weight to what happens in the worst case belonging
to R (S) , i.e. when we consider the probability distribution which gives the
lowest utility level among all the probability distributions which have support
in S. .
According to (10) , the weight α (which satisfies 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) given to this
second term, is the product of two parameters: parameter θ, which repre-
sents the aversion of the decision maker to the imprecision of information;
and parameter δ, which is an index of such an imprecision of information.
Parameter α will represent the level of "ambiguity".
The extreme case α = 0, where ambiguity is equal to zero, corresponds to
the Bayesian case where the LU maximizes expected utility under the central
distribution C. It is obtained in two cases. The first is obtained when there is
no aversion to the imprecision of information (θ = 0); the second case (δ = 0)
occurs when there is no imprecision of information around C, and therefore
no Knightian uncertainty.
The other extreme case (α = 1) corresponds to the maxmin criterion un-
der all distributions having support in S. It requires both δ = 1, i.e. complete
ignorance (except knowing that the support is contained in S), and the ex-
treme value θ = 1 of the aversion to the imprecision of information. In
this extreme case, for each decision considered, only the worst distribution,
among all the distributions having support in S, is taken into account.
2.2.3 Comparative statics
In our framework, CB transparency will aﬀect two parameters. First, more
transparency decreases the variance σ2γ of the central distribution C. The
13The set P defined by (7) is a convex set. For, from the definition of P, we can see
that if P1 and P2 belong to P, then ξP1+(1− ξ)P2 also belongs to P, for any ξ satisfying
0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. We therefore have co(P) = P. Then (7) gives
minP∈co(P )EPULU = (1− δ)ECULU + δminP∈R(S)EPULU . Substituting this expres-
sion into (8), we get (9) .
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reason is that uncertainty on the mean of P ∗ tends to make σ2γ greater than
the variance σ∗2 of P ∗. More CB transparency, which improves the precision
of the estimate of the mean of P ∗, reduces this gap and, therefore, decreases
σ2γ .
Second, more CB transparency also reduces Knightian uncertainty by
reducing δ. This occurs because more numerous or precise data, which are
the consequences of more transparency, make any posterior distribution less
dependent on the prior held on the underlying parameters of P ∗. In our
framework, this tends to reduce δ because, as indicated in section 2.2.1 above,
δ is an index measuring this dependence on priors14.
We can also note that more "political risk" which creates larger fluctua-
tions of the CB’s objectives, and which therefore takes the form of a larger
variance σ∗2 of P ∗, implies a larger variance σ2γ of C.
Therefore, we will do two kinds of comparative statics exercises. The first
concerns the variance σ2γ of the central distribution C. The analysis of the
eﬀect of σ2γ generalizes the analysis done (under a Bayesian approach) in the
literature by Sorensen (1991) and Grüner (2002), to the case where there is
some "ambiguity".
The second concerns the amount of Knightian uncertainty linked to a
change in parameter δ. From (10) , if we are not in the Bayesian case θ = 0 of
no aversion to the imprecision of information, more Knightian uncertainty,
due to a larger value of δ, implies a greater value of α. (In the Bayesian case
θ = 0 it has no eﬀect).
As an illustration, we will also compare the two opposite cases of com-
plete ignorance and of complete knowledge of P ∗, respectively. In the case of
complete ignorance, which could be the consequence of no CB transparency,
we have some value σ2γ, which satisfies σ
2
γ > σ
∗2. And we have δ = 1 because
there is no confidence at all on the central distribution. The reason is that
lack of knowledge implies that there is no confidence on the central prior on
the underlying parameters of P ∗, and it also implies that there are no data
which could make the posterior distributions diﬀer from the priors. The op-
posite case corresponds to the case where a large number of observations or
very precise data allow the statistician to estimate P ∗ with (almost) perfect
precision. In this case we would have, at the limit, P = {P ∗} , which cor-
responds to σ2γ = σ
∗2 and δ = 0 (which implies no Knightian uncertainty).
Thus, in the case of complete ignorance we would have σ2γ > σ
∗2 and α = θ;
while in the case of complete knowledge we would have σ2γ = σ
∗2, and α = 0.
14One might also consider that CB transparency could aﬀect the set S which is known
to contain the support of P ∗, and therefore could also change parameter µ. However, to
simplify the analysis, we will take S, and therefore µ, as given.
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3 Eﬀects on the nominal wage.
3.1 Nominal wage
The nominal wage chosen by the LU under uncertainty is the value bw of w
which maximizes ΩLU given by (9) , where R (S) is the set of all probability
distributions with support in S = [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] .
As a first step, let w (γ) be the nominal wage that would be chosen by the
LU under certainty, when γ is known. Maximizing ULU given by (6) gives
w (γ) =
1
Aa2γ
(11)
Then, the nominal wage bw chosen by the LU under uncertainty is given
by the following proposition (see Appendix 1 for the proof):
Proposition 1 Consider the threshold value α∗, which satisfies 0 ≤ α∗ ≤ 1,
and is given by
α∗ =
σ2γ
µ(γ0 − µ) + σ2γ
(12)
In the case α < α∗, we have
bw = 1
Aa2
γ0 − αµ
α (γ0 − µ)2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ)
(13)
We have bw < w (γ0), which means that the nominal wage is lower than
under certainty (for γ = γ0).
In the case α ≥ α∗, we have bw = w (γ0) . The nominal wage is the same
as under certainty (for γ = γ0)
15.
3.2 Change in the variance of the central distribution
In the case α < α∗, from (13) , we get ∂ bw∂σ2γ < 0. A larger value of σ2γ reduces
the nominal wage. This was the kind of result found in the literature. Here,
we show that this result still holds under the present non-Bayesian approach,
as long as "ambiguity" α is not too large (i.e. as long as we are not too far
from the Bayesian case α = 0).
15It is not possible for bw to be greater than w (γ0) . The reason is that, as long as we have
w < w (γ0) , the worst case occurs when γ is equal to γ0−µ; but, in the case w > w (γ0) ,
the worst case changes and becomes γ = γ0 + µ (see Appendix 2). The discontinuity in
the worst cases at w (γ0) allows w (γ0) to be the solution whenever we have α ≥ α∗.
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However, from Proposition 1, when the ambiguity parameter is large
enough (α > α∗), there is no eﬀect on the nominal wage of a marginal change
in σ2γ. The nominal wage always stays at the level under certainty w (γ0) ,
whatever σ2γ is. In this case, the decrease in the nominal wage, which was
found in the literature, does not exist anymore.
3.3 Change in Knightian uncertainty
Now consider a change in parameter δ, which can be considered as repre-
senting a change in Knightian uncertainty. From (10) , if we have θ 6= 0, this
implies a change in α of the same sign (nothing is changed in the Bayesian
case obtained for θ = 0).
In the case α < α∗, from (13) , we get ∂ bw∂α = 1Aa2 (γ0−µ)(σ2γ+γ0µ)D2 , where we
have D ≡ α (γ0 − µ)2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ). This gives ∂ bw∂α > 0.
Therefore, in the case α < α∗, more Knightian uncertainty, which leads
to a greater value of α, increases the nominal wage. This eﬀect has a sign
which is opposite to the sign found in the case of a larger variance σ2γ (and is
therefore also opposite to the sign of the eﬀect of a larger variance underlined
in the literature).
Although our approach is diﬀerent, we can note that, in this case, we
obtain a result similar to that of Schipper and Winschel (2004), who find
that greater Knightian uncertainty is likely to increase the nominal wage16.
In the case α > α∗, we have ∂ bw∂α = 0. Then, a (marginal) change in
Knightian uncertainty has no eﬀect on the nominal wage.
16Schipper and Winschel (2004) have examined the eﬀect of "Knightian uncertainty" in
a similar model of interaction between a LU and a CB. But this uncertainty is modelled
as strategic uncertainty in a Nash game, which constitutes a diﬀerent approach. First,
these authors consider an equilibrium where the two players play simultaneously, while,
in the literature cited and in the present paper, it is essential for the argument that an
equilibrium where the LU plays first, is considered. Second, in Schipper and Winschel
(2004), in accordance with the literature on ambiguous games, uncertainty is modelled as
Knightian uncertainty on the strategy of the other player, which leads to an equilibrium
which generalizes the Nash equilibrium. Here, and in the literature cited, uncertainty is
on a parameter of the model.
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4 Welfare eﬀects
4.1 Criterion
In this section, we consider the welfare eﬀect17. As in the existing literature18,
we assume that the random fluctuations of the CB’s utility function are not
part of society’s utility function. The CB’s weight ψ, in the CB’s utility
function, is random and fluctuates around society’s weight ψ0. For simplicity,
it is further assumed that society’s weight ψ0 corresponds to the expected
value γ0
19. Therefore, society’s utility function Us is given by
Us = −ψ0π2 − u2 (14)
where, from (4) , ψ0 is given by
ψ0 =
γ0
1− γ0
a2 (15)
Then, from (3), (5) , (14) and (15) , we get
Us = −a2
∙
γ0
1− γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2
¸
w2 (16)
In order to take into account the fact that parameter γ is uncertain,
society uses a criterion similar to (9) , which is
Ωs = (1− α)ECUs + α
∙
min
P∈R(S)
EPU s
¸
(17)
where, as in (9) , R (S) is the set of all probability distributions with support
in [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] . For simplicity, we have assumed that society’s behavior
under uncertainty is characterized by the same parameters (γ0, σ
2
γ, µ, θ, δ) as
the LU.
Define bΩs as the value of Ωs when the nonimal wage w is equal to the levelbw chosen by the LU. Then, bΩs is the criterion used by society to evaluate
the available information. We can give a more explicit expression to bΩs. We
get (see Appendix 2 for a proof) :
17Sorensen (1991) calls it the eﬀect on "macroeconomic performance". Grüner (2002)
considers the eﬀect on inflation uncertainty only.
18This is the assumption of Sorensen (1991). But the same kind of assumption is also
often made in the literature on CB transparency (e.g. Faust and Svensson (2001)).
19Because of the non linearity of the relationship between γ and ψ, this assumption is
not exactly the same as the assumption that ψ0 is the mean of ψ. We have chosen the
assumption which seems simpler for our analysis.
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Proposition 2 The criterion used by society to evaluate the available infor-
mation is bΩs = −a2Qbw2 (18)
where Q is given by
Q = γ0 +
αµ2 + (1− α)σ2γ
1− γ0
(19)
Equation (18) indicates that there are two channels through which un-
certainty can aﬀect welfare. The first goes through the nominal wage bw. As,
from Proposition 1 and (19) , we have bw > 0 and Q > 0, then (18) implies
∂bΩs
∂ bw < 0. Thus, a rise in the nominal wage is harmful, while a decrease is
beneficial. The eﬀect on the nominal wage has been studied in the previous
section.
The second channel goes through coeﬃcient Q. From (18) , we have ∂bΩs∂Q <
0. And, from (19) , we have ∂Q∂σ2γ > 0 (except for α = 1 where we have
∂Q
∂σ2γ
= 0); and ∂Q∂α > 0 (except for σ
2
γ = µ
2, where we have ∂Q∂α = 0). Therefore,
increased "uncertainty" of the kind we consider, corresponding to a higher
σ2γ or to a higher α (resulting from a higher δ), has an unfavorable eﬀect
through this channel (except in some special cases where there is no eﬀect).
This channel corresponds to the harmful eﬀect that an increase in each kind
of "uncertainty" has on welfare, when the nominal wage is given.
4.2 Change in the variance of the central distribution
We get the following result (see Appendix 3 for a proof):
Proposition 3 (i) In the case α < α∗, ∂bΩs∂σ2γ has the same sign as Z given by
Z = 2γ0 − 3γ20 + σ2γ +
¡
µ2 − σ2γ + 2γ0µ
¢
α (20)
Therefore, a larger variance σ2γ is beneficial when we have Z > 0, and is
harmful when we have Z < 0 (with no eﬀect on welfare when Z = 0).
(ii) In the case α > α∗, we have ∂bΩs∂σ2γ < 0 if α 6= 1, and ∂bΩs∂σ2γ = 0 if α = 1.
Therefore, in this case, when the variance σ2γ gets larger, welfare is reduced
(except in the maxmin case α = 1, where it is unchanged)20.
20In the case α = α∗, (i) applies when we have dσ2γ < 0, while (ii) applies when we have
dσ2γ > 0.
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In the case α < α∗, as we have underlined in the previous section, a larger
value of σ2γ lowers the nominal wage. This beneficial eﬀect can counterbalance
the unfavorable eﬀect going through a higher value ofQ. This why, depending
on the values of the parameters, welfare may be either improved or worsened
by a larger variance σ2γ.
The result that a higher variance of the central probability distribution
may be beneficial corresponds to the result underlined by Sorensen (1991)
in the Bayesian case. Such a possibility is now seen to also hold in the non-
Bayesian case α 6= 0, and we have given the conditions under which welfare
is improved by an increase in σ2γ . (These are that both inequalities α < α
∗
and Z > 0 are satisfied)21.
In the case α > α∗, according to Proposition 1, the nominal wage is not
changed. Therefore, there remains only the second channel, going through
Q, which is in favor of a reduction in the variance σ2γ (except in the case
α = 1, where we have ∂Q∂σ2γ = 0) . This is why, in this case, welfare is
reduced by an increase in σ2γ. Thus, the result obtained in the literature
that a higher variance might be beneficial, does not hold anymore when the
ambiguity parameter α (which can be taken as an index of the distance from
the Bayesian case) becomes larger than α∗.
21It may be instructive to compare the results we obtain in the special case α = 0, which
is the Bayesian case, to what is obtained in the literature under the Bayesian approach.
According to our results, in the Bayesian case α = 0, welfare may either improve or
deteriorate, depending on the values of the parameters. From (20), in the case α = 0, the
inequality Z > 0 becomes equivalent to γ0 (2− 3γ0) + σ2γ > 0. Therefore, when we have
γ0 <
2
3 , we always have Z > 0, which means that a larger variance always improves welfare.
But, in the case γ0 >
2
3 , we have the opposite result when σ
2
γ is not too large, i.e. when
we have σ2γ < γ0 (3γ0 − 2) : then, a larger variance is harmful. However, this ambiguous
eﬀect on welfare that we find in the Bayesian case α = 0, is actually not the same as the
ambiguous result of Sorensen (1991), who also found that increased uncertainty may either
improve or worsen welfare. In Sorensen (1991), the ambiguity of the result was entirely due
to the presence of shocks in the unemployment equation. And, in the absence of shocks,
the analysis of Sorensen (1991) actually implies that greater uncertainty always increases
welfare (See equation (14) p. 379 in Sorensen (1991)). But, in the present analysis, we do
not have such shocks and, nonetheless, we do have an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare.
This discrepancy between our results and those of Sorensen (1991) can be explained by
the fact that Sorensen (1991) made the simplifying assumption ψ0 = a = 1, which, from
(4) , implies γ0 =
1
2 . But, in this case, the inequality γ0 <
2
3 is satisfied. Then, as we have
just pointed out, we are in the case where we always have Z > 0 and where, consequently,
an increase in σ2γ always improves welfare. Therefore, by not restricting the analysis to
the special case γ0 =
1
2 considered in Sorensen (1991), we find an ambiguous eﬀect on
welfare in the Bayesian case α = 0, even in the absence of shocks.
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4.3 Change in Knightian uncertainty
From (10) , in the Bayesian case θ = 0, there is no eﬀect of a change in
Knightian uncertainty due to a change in δ. But, when we have θ 6= 0, a
change in δ implies a change in α of the same sign. Then, the two channels
previously considered never go into opposite directions. Thus, consider an in-
crease in α, which corresponds to a higher amount of Knightian uncertainty.
According to the analysis of Section 3, this implies a higher (or unchanged)
nominal wage, which has an unfavorable (or null) eﬀect on welfare. In ad-
dition, as we have underlined, the second channel, through coeﬃcient Q, is
also unfavorable, or at most null in some special cases. As a consequence,
welfare is in general strictly reduced. It is unchanged only in the special case
where both the nominal wage bw and coeﬃcient Q are unchanged. According
to Proposition 1 and (19) , this occurs when we have both α > α∗ and σγ = µ
(this last condition is satisfied when C is concentrated on the two extreme
values γ0 − µ and γ0 + µ). Therefore, we get
Proposition 4 A greater amount of Knightian uncertainty corresponding
to a higher value of δ, never decreases welfare. In general, it strictly reduces
welfare. It leaves welfare unchanged only in some special cases (the Bayesian
case θ = 0; and, when we have θ 6= 0, in the case where both α > α∗ and
σγ = µ hold).
Therefore, the point made in the literature under the Bayesian approach,
which is that greater "uncertainty" may improve welfare, does not hold when
we consider Knightian uncertainty. In general, greater Knightian uncertainty
(strictly) reduces welfare.
4.4 Implications
As we have indicated in section 2.2.3 above, more CB transparency has two
eﬀects. One is to reduce the variance σ2γ of the central distribution C .
The other is to reduce Knightian uncertainty, because of a smaller δ. As we
have seen, this last eﬀect is favorable to more CB transparency, because a
decrease in Knightian uncertainty is never harmful (and is in general ben-
eficial). Therefore, in the case where ambiguity is not too large (α < α∗),
the possible unfavorable eﬀect due a lower σ2γ is dampened, and may even
be dominated by the favorable eﬀect due to a smaller amount of Knightian
uncertainty. In the case where ambiguity is large enough (α > α∗), both
eﬀects contribute to make CB transparency beneficial. Thus, when we are
far enough from the Bayesian case, the result obtained in the literature that
CB transparency can be harmful never holds.
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In the Bayesian analysis done in the literature, neither the beneficial eﬀect
going through reduced Knightian uncertainty, nor the fact that a reduced
variance σ2γ is favorable when ambiguity is large enough, were taken into
account. For these two reasons, our non-Bayesian analysis gives results more
favorable to CB transparency than those obtained in the literature under the
Bayesian approach.
As an illustration, consider what happens when we go from complete
ignorance to complete knowledge of the underlying probability distribution
P ∗. Such a move may be viewed as an extreme case of the eﬀect of CB
transparency. As indicated in Section 2.2.3 above, this means that we go
from (σ2γ,1 > σ
∗2; α1 = θ) to (σ2γ,2 = σ
∗2; α2 = 0).
In the Bayesian case θ = 0, the favorable eﬀect going through reduced
Knightian uncertainty is absent. But, according to (13) , the smaller value
of σ2γ would increase the nominal wage. This has an unfavorable eﬀect on
welfare. On the other hand, there is a direct favorable eﬀect on welfare
through a smaller value of coeﬃcient Q in (18): σ2γ,1 > σ
2
γ,2 implies Q2 <
Q1. This is why, depending on the parameters, such a move from complete
ignorance to complete knowledge of P ∗ can either be beneficial or harmful.
A suﬃcient condition for this change to be harmful is that it is harmful for
all marginal changes considered along the path. According to Proposition 3
(with α = 0), this is equivalent to having γ0 (2− 3γ0)+σ2γ > 0 for all σ2γ such
that σ∗2 ≤ σ2γ ≤ σ2γ,1, which is equivalent to having γ0 (2− 3γ0) + σ∗2 > 0.
In the case γ0 <
2
3
, this condition is always fulfilled. Such a move, which
could be due to more CB transparency, would be harmful in this case. This
corresponds to the kind of result that was underlined in the literature under
the Bayesian approach.
In the non-Bayesian case θ > 0, results may become quite diﬀerent when
θ is large enough. This occurs when the beneficial eﬀect of the elimination
of Knightian uncertainty always dominate the potentially harmful eﬀect of a
reduced variance of the central distribution. Thus, consider the case θ > α∗1
(where α∗1 is given by (12), where σ
2
γ is replaced by σ
2
γ,1). Then, as we
have α1 = θ > α∗1, Proposition 1implies that, under complete ignorance, the
nominal wage bw1 is equal to the level under certainty w (γ0) . On the other
hand, under complete knowledge, bw2 is smaller than w (γ0) (at least as long as
we have σ∗ > 0)22. This decrease in the nominal wage improves welfare. This
22Under complete knowledge of P ∗, as we have α2 = 0, we are in the case α2 < α∗2
(where α∗2 is given by (12) and σ
2
γ = σ
∗) if we have σ∗ > 0.
Note that if we had σ∗ = 0, and therefore α∗2 = 0, the nominal wage bw2 would be
equal to w (γ0) , and therefore be the same under complete knowledge as under complete
ignorance. But there would still remain the favorable direct eﬀect on welfare going through
a smaller value of coeﬃcient Q. Therefore, even in the case σ∗ = 0, such an increase in
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eﬀect is reinforced by the direct eﬀect going through coeﬃcient Q in (18): as
both σ2γ and α are smaller, we have Q2 < Q1. Consequently, the overall eﬀect
on welfare is always favorable. A suﬃciently large aversion to the imprecision
of information θ can therefore make such a move from complete ignorance
to complete knowledge of the underlying probability distribution P ∗, always
beneficial. The result, obtained in the Bayesian case, that such a move can
be harmful, does not hold in this case.
Finally, as indicated in section 2.2.3 above, more political risk implies
a larger variance σ2γ of the central distribution C. Therefore, the eﬀect of
political risk directly follows from the previous analysis of the eﬀect of σ2γ.
Thus, when we are far enough from the Bayesian case because ambiguity is
large enough (α > α∗), more political risk is never beneficial (and in general
is harmful). It is only when ambiguity is not too large (α < α∗), i.e. when we
are not too far from the Bayesian case, that we obtain the result underlined
in the literature that more political risk could be beneficial.
5 Conclusion
The literature on central bank transparency mainly uses an expected utility
Bayesian approach to uncertainty. Here, we have underlined that the results
obtained may be very diﬀerent when we depart from this Bayesian approach
and use a non-Bayesian approach to uncertainty, which contains the Bayesian
approach as a special case, but which, more generally, introduces an aversion
to ambiguity and Knightian uncertainty.
We have considered a specific argument which appears in the literature.
This argument shows that more uncertainty on central bank (CB) preferences
could be beneficial because, in a game between the CB and a monopoly
labor union (LU), this would lead the LU to lower the nominal wage. Such a
result has been interpreted as an argument showing that political uncertainty,
which creates fluctuations of CB objectives, may be beneficial; and also as
an argument against CB transparency, because more CB transparency would
tend to reduce the uncertainty that the private sector has on CB preferences.
We have tried to extend and revaluate this argument (obtained under
the standard Bayesian expected utility approach in the literature) by using
a non-Bayesian framework.
In our framework, as in the literature, political factors create fluctua-
tions of CB preferences. These fluctuations follow some probability distri-
bution which is only imperfectly known to the private sector. Under the
non-Bayesian approach we have considered, the information available to the
CB transparency would always be beneficial.
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LU has two parts. First, there is a "central probability distribution" which
reflects two things: the fluctuations of the CB’s preferences, on the one hand;
and the estimate of this distribution under some central prior on the para-
meters underlying this distribution, on the other hand. More political risk,
which leads to more fluctuations of CB preferences, increases the variance
of this central distribution. And more CB transparency, which increases the
accuracy of the estimates, reduces this variance.
Second, in addition to this central distribution, the information avail-
able to the private sector also takes the form of some Knightian uncertainty
around this central probability distribution. Such an uncertainty results from
the lack of confidence that the private sector has on its priors when it tries
to estimate the probability distribution which governs the fluctuations of
the CB’s preferences. More CB transparency, which increases the amount
and quality of data, reduces this Knightian uncertainty by diminishing the
importance of priors relatively to data in the resulting estimates.
We have considered the eﬀects of the corresponding two parameters which
are aﬀected by CB transparency: the variance of the central distribution, on
the one hand; and a parameter which an index of the amount of Knightian
uncertainty, on the other hand.
When we consider the eﬀect of a change in the variance of the central
distribution, the level of "ambiguity" has been shown to play a crucial role.
"Ambiguity" is a mix of two parameters of the model: the "aversion to the
imprecision of information" of the decision maker, on the one hand; and a
parameter which is an index of the amount of Knightian uncertainty, on the
other hand. This ambiguity parameter can be considered as an index measur-
ing the distance from the Bayesian case. When ambiguity is lower than some
threshold value, then a greater variance of the central distribution lowers
the nominal wage and, consequently, can be beneficial for some values of the
parameters. As a consequence, greater fluctuations of the CB’s preferences,
due to more political risk, can be beneficial; and, as more CB transparency
decreases the variance of the central distribution, this also gives an argument
against CB transparency. This result can be seen as a generalization of the
result obtained in the literature in the Bayesian case of no ambiguity, to the
non-Bayesian case, where ambiguity is not zero, but still not too large.
However, when ambiguity becomes larger than the threshold value, a
greater variance of the central distribution does not aﬀect the nominal wage
(which stays equal to the nominal wage under certainty), and, consequently,
can never be beneficial (and is in general harmful). This means that the
result obtained in the literature under the Bayesian approach, does not hold
when ambiguity is large enough: in this case, more political risk is in general
harmful; and the eﬀect of CB transparency which goes through a reduced
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variance of the central distribution, becomes favorable.
As long as ambiguity is not equal to zero, i.e. as soon as we depart from
the Bayesian case, more Knightian uncertainty is never beneficial. In general,
it is harmful. There are two reasons for that. First, the nominal wage is never
lowered (and is even raised when ambiguity is not too large), and, second,
for a given nominal wage, increased Knightian uncertainty tends to decrease
welfare.
This favorable eﬀect on welfare of reduced Knightian uncertainty is an
other argument in favor of CB transparency which was not taken into account
in the literature. When ambiguity is not too large, the favorable eﬀect going
through reduced Knightian uncertainty dampens, or may even dominate, the
possible unfavorable eﬀect due to a reduced variance of the central distribu-
tion that more CB transparency may imply. And, when ambiguity is large
enough, as the two eﬀects go into the same direction, the favorable eﬀect of
reduced Knightian uncertainty further contributes to make CB transparency
beneficial.
As an illustration, we have considered the extreme case where a change in
CB transparency would imply a move from complete ignorance to complete
knowledge of the underlying probability distribution followed by the CB’s
preferences. In the Bayesian case, such a move can be harmful. However,
when the aversion to the imprecision of information is large enough, then, be-
cause of the favorable eﬀect due to the elimination of Knightian uncertainty,
such a move has been shown to be always beneficial.
Therefore, in the presence of ambiguity and of Knightian uncertainty,
the specific argument that we have considered (which, in the literature, was
developed under a Bayesian approach) may become an argument for trans-
parency rather than against transparency.
Appendices
1. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the termminP∈R(S)EPULU in (9) .The function ULU(γ,w) given
by (6) is a quadratic concave function of γ.As a consequence, in (9) , the prob-
ability distribution with support [γ0 − µ, γ0 + µ] which minimizes EPULU is
obtained either for the probability distribution which gives γ = γ0 − µ with
probability one, or for the probability distribution which gives γ = γ0 + µ
with probability one. We get γ = γ0 − µ as a solution when we have
ULU (γ0 − µ,w) ≤ ULU (γ0 + µ,w). Using (6) and (11) , this can be writ-
ten 2µAa2γ0w [w − w (γ0)] ≤ 0. Therefore, as we have w (γ0) > 0, the value
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γ = γ0 − µ is a solution in the case 0 ≤ w ≤ w (γ0) , while γ = γ0 + µ is a
solution in the cases w ≤ 0 and w ≥ w (γ0) (and there is indiﬀerence between
γ0 − µ and γ0 + µ when w = 0 or w = w (γ0)).
Consider the function eΩLU(γ,w) defined by
eΩLU(γ,w) ≡ αULU(γ, w) + (1− α)ECULU(γ,w) (21)
Using (6) , we can see that eΩLU(γ,w) is a quadratic concave function of
w which is maximized for ew (γ) given by
ew (γ) = 1
Aa2
αγ + (1− α) γ0
αγ2 + (1− α) (γ20 + σ2γ)
(22)
On the interval ]−∞, 0] , as we just have shown, we haveminP∈R(S)EPULU =
ULU(γ0 + µ) and therefore, from (9) , we have Ω
LU = eΩLU(γ0 + µ,w). As a
consequence, on the interval ]−∞, 0], the value of w which maximizes ΩLU
is equal to min [ew(γ0 + µ), 0]. As we have ew(γ0 + µ) > 0, this is equal to 0.
On the interval [w (γ0) ,+∞[ we also have minP∈R(S)EPULU = ULU(γ0+µ),
and therefore the value of w which maximizes ΩLU on this interval is equal
to max[ew(γ0 + µ), w (γ0)]. Using (11) and (22) we can see that we always
have ew(γ0 + µ) < w (γ0) . Therefore, on the interval [w (γ0) ,+∞[ , the op-
timal value of w is w (γ0) . These results imply that 0 is (strictly) better
than any value of w which belongs to ]−∞, 0[ , and that w (γ0) is (strictly)
better than any value of w which belongs to ]w (γ0) ,+∞[ . As a conse-
quence, the value bw which maximizes ΩLU , given by (9) , has to belong
to the interval [0, w (γ0)] . But we have shown that on [0, w (γ0)] we have
minP∈R(S)EPULU = ULU(γ0 − µ), and therefore ΩLU = eΩLU(γ0 − µ,w). As
we have ew(γ0 − µ) > 0, this implies bw = min [ew(γ0 − µ), w (γ0)] . Using (11)
and (22), we get that min [ew(γ0 − µ), w (γ0)] is equal to ew(γ0 − µ) in the
case α < α∗, and to w (γ0) in the case α > α
∗, ew(γ0 − µ) and w (γ0) being
equal in the case α = α∗. The two cases of Proposition 1 directly follow.
The inequality bw < w (γ0) comes from (11) , (13) and the inequality µ < γ0.
QED
2. Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider the termminP∈R(S)EPUS in (17). From (16), this is equiv-
alent to maxP∈R(S)EP
h
γ0
1−γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2
i
. As the term into brackets is a
quadratic convex function of γ, the maximum can be attained only on the set
of the two extreme distributions where we have γ = γ0 − µ with probability
one, or γ = γ0 + µ with probability one. It can be seen that γ = γ0 − µ and
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γ = γ0 + µ actually always give the same value to
γ0
1−γ0
(1− γ)2 + γ2. Thus,
replacing γ by γ0 − µ, or equivalently by γ0 + µ, in (16) we get
min
P∈R(S)
EPU s = −a2
µ
γ0 +
µ2
1− γ0
¶
w2 (23)
Second, from (16) , we obtain ECUs = −a2
³
γ0 +
σ2γ
1−γ0
´
w2. Substituting
this expression and (23) into (17) , and replacing w by bw, we get (18) and
(19) . QED
4. Proof of Proposition 3
From (18) , we have
∂bΩs
∂σ2γ
= −a2 bwµ2Q ∂ bw
∂σ2γ
+ bw ∂Q
∂σ2γ
¶
(24)
In the case α < α∗, using (13), (19) and (24) , we obtain after calculus
∂bΩs
∂σ2γ
= G (1− α)Z, where we have G ≡ bw
A(α(γ0−µ)2+(1−α)(γ20+σ2γ))
2
γ0−αµ
1−γ0
> 0,
and where Z is given by (20) . As we are in the case α < α∗, and as we have
α∗ ≤ 1, we necessarily have α < 1, which implies that ∂bΩs∂σ2γ has the sign of Z.
In the case α > α∗, according to proposition 1, we have ∂ bw∂σ2γ = 0 . From
(24), this implies that ∂bΩs∂σ2γ has the opposite sign of ∂Q∂σ2γ . But from (19) , we
have ∂Q∂σ2γ > 0 if α 6= 1, and
∂Q
∂σ2γ
= 0 if α = 1. QED
References
[1] Berger, J. and L.M. Berliner (1986), "Robust Bayes and Empirical Bayes
Analysis with ε-Contaminated Priors", The Annals of Statistics, Vol.
14, No. 2, 461-486.
[2] Blinder, A.S., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, J. De Haan and D.-J. Jansen
(2008), "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Sur-
vey of Theory and Evidence", Journal of Economic Literature, 46:4,
910-945.
[3] Cukierman, A. and F. Lippi (1999), "Central Bank Independence, Cen-
tralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: The-
ory and Some Evidence", European Economic Review, 43, 1395-1434.
[4] Dai, M. and M. Sidiropoulos (2008), Central Bank’s Conservativeness
and Transparency, Research in Economics, 62, 179-187.
22
[5] Eichberger, J. and D. Kelsey (1999), "E-Capacities and the Ellsberg
Paradox", Theory and Decision, 46, 107-140
[6] Ellsberg, D. (1961),"Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms", Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 75,.643-669.
[7] Epstein, L.G. and T. Wang (1994), "Intertemporal Asset Pricing under
Knightian Uncertainty", Econometrica, 62 (3), March.
[8] Faust, J. and L.E.O. Svensson (2001), "Transparency and Credibility:
Monetary Policy with Unobserved Goals", International Economic
Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, May, 369-397.
[9] Gajdos, T., Tallon, J.-M. and J.-C. Vergnaud (2004), "Decision Making
with Imprecise Probabilistic Information", Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 40, 647-681.
[10] Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler ((1989), "Maximin Expected Utility with
Non-Unique Prior", Journal Mathematical Economics,18, 141-153.
[11] Grüner, H.P. (2002), "How Much Should Central Banks Talk? A New
Argument", Economics Letters, 77, 195-198.
[12] Knight, F.H. (1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Boston: Houghton
Miﬄin.
[13] Mukerji, S. and J.-M. Tallon (2004), "An overview of economic appli-
cations of David Schmeidlers’s models of decision making under un-
certainty" in I.Gilboa, (ed), Uncertainty in Economic Theory: A
collection of essays in honor of David Schmeidler’s 65th birthday,
Routledge Publishers.
[14] Schipper, B.C. and E. Winschel (2004), "Knightian Intransparency of
Central Bank and Labor Union", May.
[15] Schmeidler, D. (1989), "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility
without Additivity", Econometrica, Vol.57, No. 3, May, 571-587.
[16] Sorensen, J.R. (1991), "Political Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Per-
formance", Economics Letters, 37, 377-381.
[17] Van der Cruijsen, C. and S. Eijﬃnger (2007), "The Economic Impact
of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey", Center for Economic
Research Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, January.
23
